For nite pure strategy sets S 1 ; : : : ; S n , if E S = S 1 : : : S n is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for an open set of payo s vectors, then #E #S=(max i #S i ). There is an open set of payo vectors for which there are #S=(max i #S i ) pure Nash equilibria.
The Maximal Generic Number of Pure Nash Equilibria by Andrew McLennan A normal form game can have as many pure strategy Nash equilibria as there are pure strategy vectors, if each agent's payo never depends on her own choice of strategy, but this phenomenon is not robust with respect to perturbations of payo s. This note characterizes the largest sets of pure strategy vectors that are the sets of pure strategy equilibria for open sets of payo s. In addition to resolving a point of curiosity, this and related results have implications for the worst case running times of algorithms that compute all Nash equilibria.
Several recent papers deal with the number of Nash equilibria possessed by normal form games. Fixing strategy spaces, McKelvey and McLennan (1994) characterize the maximal (as the payo s are varied) number of regular totally mixed equilibria. It is a longstanding open problem to show that for two agents, each with k pure strategies, there is an open dense subset of payo s on which there are at most 2 k ? 1 Nash equilibria. Quinn and Shubik con rm 1 this conjecture for the case k = 3. Extending earlier results, Stanford (1993) characterizes the asymptotic (as the strategy spaces of at least two agents increase in size) probability that a \randomly selected" payo vector will have exactly m pure strategy equilibria. Stanford (1994) extends this analysis to symmetric two person games, di erentiating between symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Let the set of agents be I = f 1; : : : ; n g. Let nite strategy sets S 1 ; : : : ; S n be given, and let S = S 1 : : : S n . We say that E S is thin if, for any distinct s; t 2 E, there are at least two i such that s i 6 = t i . That is, there do not exist distinct s; t 2 E with s j = t j for all j except some particular agent i.
Lemma: If u 1 ; : : : ; u n 2 R S are payo s such that u i (s) 6 = u i (t) for all i and all distinct s; t 2 S, and E is the set of pure Nash equilibria for u 1 ; : : : ; u n , then E is thin.
Proof: Otherwise there exist s; t 2 E and an agent i such that s i 6 = t i while (s j ) j6 =i = (t j ) j6 =i . The hypothesis does not allow both s i and t i to be best responses to (s j ) j6 =i .
1 Personal communication.
{ 1 { Proposition: If E is nonempty and thin, then there is an open set of (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) 2 (R S ) I for which E is the set of pure Nash equilibria.
Proof: Let E 0 = E, and de ne E 1 ; : : : ; E n inductively by E k = f s 2 S ? (E 0 : : : E k?1 ) : there is t 2 (E 0 : : : E k?1 ) such that s i 6 = t i for exactly one i g: Evidently E 0 ; : : : ; E n is a partition of S. De ne (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) by setting u i (s) = ?k for all i and s 2 E k . Then it is easily seen that E will be the set of pure Nash equilibria for all vectors of payo s in a neighborhood of (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ).
We say that a thin set is maximal if there is no thin proper superset. We say that a thin set is svelte if there is no thin set with a larger number of elements. It seems reasonable to conjecture that maximal thin sets are svelte, but I do not know if this is the case.
Our main result is:
Theorem: Assume that #S 1 : : : #S n . Then:
A. Svelte subsets of S have #S 2 : : : #S n elements; B. There are #S n pairwise disjoint svelte sets.
Proof: We argue by induction on n. Both claims are trivial when n = 1, so assume that the claims have been established when there are n ? 1 agents. Let S n = f s 1 n ; : : : ; s m n g. If E is svelte, then E = m h=1 F h fs h n g, where F 1 ; : : : ; F m are pairwise disjoint thin subsets of S 1 : : : S n?1 . Therefore svelte subsets of S have at most #S 2 : : : #S n?1 #S n elements. On the other hand, if F 1 ; : : : ; F m are pairwise disjoint thin subsets of S 1 : : : S n?1 , then for each q = 1; : : : m, E q = (F 1 fs 1+q n g) : : : (F m?q fs m n g) (F m?q+1 fs 1 n g) : : : (F m fs q n g)
is thin, and E 1 ; : : : ; E m are pairwise disjoint.
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